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Funding policies for science are usually directed at supporting technological innovations. The im-
pact and success of such policies depend crucially on how science and technology are connected to 
each other. I propose an “interactive view” of the relationship between basic science and technol-
ogy development which comprises the following four claims: First, technological change derives 
from science but only in part. The local models used in accounting for technologically relevant 
phenomena contain theoretical and non-theoretical elements alike. Second, existing technologies 
and rules of experience constitute another major repository of technological inventions. Third, 
technology dynamics is only weakly coupled to progress in basic science but it is closely related to 
science. There is a dependence of technological change on a more fundamental understanding, to 
be sure, but it is of an indirect and long-term character. Fourth, progress in basic research is some-
times the effect (rather than the cause) of technological change. Technological change sometimes 
brings about increased theoretical understanding (application innovation). 
1. Science Policy and the Advancement of Technology 
In the past half-century, scientific research has enjoyed financial support to an unprece-
dented degree. The reason behind this expenditure is not the hope for clarification of the nature of 
dark energy, nor the desire to learn more about supersymmetry. Underlying public and private 
sponsoring of research alike is the idea that science is a primary source of for technology devel-
opment which is in turn viewed as a driving force of economic growth. In what follows I will con-
sider science policies and funding strategies from the angle of such expectations. In other words, 
what could a science-policy be like that strengthens the technological productivity of science 
(leaving aside the ambivalent relationship between technological change and the labor market)? I 
attempt to highlight those features of scientific research that are relevant for technological innova-
tion. 
Projects of this sort thrive or fail on the appropriateness of distinguishing between kinds of 
scientific research. The distinction between basic or epistemic research, on the one hand, and ap-
plied research, on the other, is of foremost importance in this respect. It is objected occasionally 
that such a distinction cannot be sustained in that applied research, like basic research, produces 
new knowledge, and in that basic research, like applied research, has an impact on technology. The
observation behind the objection is justified, to be sure, but merely of a limited bearing. It is still 
possible to conceptually separate basic and applied research by appeal to the goals pursued or, 
correspondingly, by the success criteria invoked. Epistemic research primarily strives for under-
standing natural phenomena or processes, applied research aims at practical needs or utility
(Stokes 1997, 6-8). Correspondingly, the success of a project in applied research is assessed by 
economic standards whereas epistemic projects are judged according to the understanding gained. 
Such standard need not be assumed hypothetically, they are laid open publicly. Attempts to build 
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lenges on the present agenda, are supported by estimates of the future potential market volume. 
Endeavors like the quest for the Higgs boson, by contrast, are justified by appeal to the human 
desire to understand nature’s workings. The conceptual boundary between epistemic and applied 
research is marked by the commitment to understanding and utility, respectively. However, this 
distinction does not imply an empirical dichotomy; it does not rule out that a given research pro-
ject serves both ends simultaneously. 
Within the framework of this distinction between the basic and the applied, the question to 
be pursued here takes the following form: What is the role of theoretical knowledge or epistemic 
research in accomplishing technological innovations? In particular, can it be recommended that 
science policy sponsor thorough and broad theoretical analyses or are technological challenges be
mastered better by concentrating on research that is directly connected to the particulars of the case 
at hand? To put it differently, is utility an outgrowth of understanding? 
2. The Cascade Model v. Emergentism 
The Scientific Revolution was fueled by the prospect of technological progress. Research 
into the laws of nature was claimed to be the royal road toward the betterment of the human condi-
tion. Conversely, seeking utility without understanding was considered a vain attempt. The power 
of intervention in the course of nature only accrues from disentangling the underlying causal fab-
ric. Francis Bacon is the chief advocate of the principle that systematic basic research or epistemic 
penetration is the prerequisite of technology development. According to this cascade model (or 
“linear model”) research striving for understanding is the chief source of technological change. 
The idea is that scientific knowledge flows smoothly from the highbrow principles to the practical 
solutions and becomes manifest, eventually, in useful devices. Practical tasks are best solved by 
bringing to bear insights into the mechanisms at work and understanding of the fundamentals (Ba-
con 1620, Bk. I., §3, §110, §117, §129; see Carrier 2006, 16, Carrier 2007, 22).
This traditional position was laid down and renewed in a highly influential way in a report 
Vannevar Bush delivered in 1945. Bush suggested basic research as the pivot of practical progress. 
As he argued, technological innovations are not likely to be generated by research narrowly tar-
geted at the problem at hand. A more promising strategy is to conduct fundamental research whose 
technological fertility can be assumed to be superior for two reasons. First, the solution to a practi-
cal problem can arise as an unexpected consequence of a seemingly remote scientific principle. 
Second, practical progress is often reached through a novel combination of knowledge pieces. The 
two arguments entail that the theoretical resources apt for clearing up a practical difficulty cannot 
be established beforehand. Rather, practical success may be made possible by findings that are 
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knowledge capital from which interests in the form of technological accomplishments are drawn 
(Bush 1945, Chap. 3). 
After the Second World War this attitude was strongly dominant and formed the basis of 
research policies adopted by state institutions and industrial corporations. It was universally held 
that the advancement of a deeper scientific understanding was indispensible for a technological 
breakthrough and that the best strategy for stimulating the latter was promoting the former. As a 
result, industry-sponsored laboratories were set up which were devoted to basic research. 
However, the intertwinement between basic research and technology development turned 
out not to be as close as anticipated. Historically speaking, science began to gain significance for 
engineering purposes not until the Second Industrial Revolution in the latter part of the 19th cen-
tury, and only in the 20th century did the impact of science on technological change extend to lar-
ger parts of industry. Further, it happens that new technologies do not derive from scientific prin-
ciples but rather build on existing technology or are due to tinkering at the bench. For instance, 
pharmacological research was for a long time (and in part still is) dominated by a methodology of 
trial and error. For instance, the most widespread procedure used in drug research throughout the 
20th century is schematic screening. A large number of potentially effective substances is adminis-
tered to model organisms or tissue test systems and their effects are registered. When a successful 
medication had been tracked down by a procedure of this sort, it was in no way automatically clear 
how the drug operated. As a matter of fact, this is true of a significant fraction of the drugs in use 
today. Aspirin had successfully relieved headache for almost a century before its biological 
mechanism was finally disclosed. In such cases, medical progress did obviously not rely on under-
standing. 
The progressive realization that technological change sometimes proceeds independent of 
progress in basic science generated a major change of attitude in the latter third of the 20th century. 
It was no longer assumed that sponsoring pure research would guarantee cutting-edge technology. 
Among the early stages of this reorientation was a survey of the U.S. Department of Defense con-
ducted in the late 1960s which found almost no connection between the physical operation of 
weapons systems then in use and more recent scientific discoveries (Stokes 1997, 55). As a result, 
funding policies generally switched to sponsoring targeted, short-term research projects which 
directly address specific problems. 
Examples of this sort militate against the cascade model. In addition, developments in phi-
losophy of science cast doubt upon the cascade model as well. Nancy Cartwright has drawn atten-
tion to the failure of universal laws to account for concrete phenomena with their rich details and 
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the more subtle features of nature. They overgeneralize and thus lose touch with the richness of 
detail the phenomena exhibit. If the concrete experiences are supposed to be accounted for, gener-
alizations of non-theoretical origin need to be part of the models (in addition to initial and bound-
ary conditions). Rules of experience and specific assumptions bear the explanatory burden; tailor-
made approaches are needed when the experiences are to be addressed in their full complexity. 
Descriptive adequacy is limited to small-scale accounts; comprehensive theories inevitably lose 
touch with the phenomena. The patchwork quilt symbolizes the structure of scientific knowledge 
(Cartwright 1994, 322-323). 
Such an approach may be termed “emergentist.” Emergentists feature the specific character 
of the phenomena at each level of organization and deny that insights about the constituents will 
have much impact on the clarification of the properties of organized wholes. The emergentist posi-
tion does not refer to applied science in the first place but rather to “applying science”. The chief 
claim is that it is highly non-trivial to hook up theory with evidence and that the only way to get a 
grip on the phenomena is by making use of specific models that are tightly locked onto a particular 
problem. Still, emergentist approaches are tied up with a particular conception of applied research. 
The cascade model is abandoned; basic research is said to be largely unsuccessful in meeting ap-
plied challenges. Practical challenges should be addressed by doing research on precisely these 
practical challenges rather than directing research to the elucidation of the underlying principles 
and mechanisms (Carrier 2004b, 1-2; Carrier 2006, 18-19; Adam, Carrier & Wilholt 2006, 438). 
Thus we are faced with two contrary views on the relationship between basic and applied 
research. The general contrast between the cascade and the patchwork quilt brings a markedly dif-
ferent assessment of the bearing of fundamental theories on the solution of practical problems in 
its train. Consequently, the recommendations as to how applied research should proceed and which 
type of research should be supported are strongly at variance with each other. 
3. Local Models in Applied Research 
It has frequently been observed that—in contrast to the emergentist position—overarching 
theories do contribute essentially to explaining concrete phenomena. Yet such theories cannot bear 
the explanatory burden completely on their own; rather, models are needed as “mediators” be-
tween theory and evidence (Morrison & Morgan 1999). The salient point is that the models typi-
cally used for applying theories are more complex than it was traditionally assumed in the philoso-
phy of science. Such mediating models often do not only contain laws and boundary conditions 
but additional conceptual elements, such as generalizations from divergent theoretical sources or 
even without theoretical backing (that is, rules of experience), approximations and correction fac-
5tors, or parameters that can only be evaluated empirically (that is, read off from the data). Conse-
quently, such models cannot be derived from highbrow theory. They rather rely to a considerable 
extent on extra-theoretical assumptions and their construction may involve a highly creative proc-
ess. The “articulation” of a theory, the procedure of bringing to bear theoretical principles on con-
crete evidence, does in no way resemble a deductive chain but needs to resort to additional empiri-
cal, conceptual, and mathematical resources (Morrison 1999; Winsberg 2003; see Carrier 2004b, 
9-13). 
If the amount of adjustment of a model to the particular case in question is comparatively 
large, I speak of a “local model.” Just to convey a rough idea, a model of the planetary system 
within Newtonian celestial mechanics is not local, a model of the spreading of Victoria perch 
within evolutionary theory is local. Much more empirical information, as inferred from the phe-
nomena, is contained in the evolutionary model than in the mechanical one. Models are typically 
adjusted to a particular problem situation by parameter evaluations and correction factors, and a 
model is local if there are lots of specifics to be added and if they are restricted to a narrow scope. 
My claim is that applied science typically proceeds by constructing local models. The reason is 
that the variegated details of the phenomena typically escape the grip of comprehensive theory
which merely addresses the generic features of the situation. Yet technology development is bound 
to take the quantitative particulars into consideration. Descriptive adequacy is often only accom-
plished by small-scale accounts as provided by local models. 
However, the conceptual structure of the local models developed in applied research is
typically still shaped by general theory. Applied research does in no way proceed on the exclusive 
basis of observational generalizations, experience-based regularities, ad-hoc assumptions, or rules 
of thumb. The conceptual backbone of such models, as a rule, derives from theory; the necessary 
adjustments are made by way of modifying this theory-based structure. Let me buttress this claim 
by giving an example. 
“Giant magnetoresistance” is a physical effect discovered in 1988 and quickly explored by 
industrial research laboratories. The relevant arrays involve a sandwich-like structure in which two 
ferromagnetic semiconducting layers cover a non-ferromagnetic conductor layer in between. It 
was found that the electric resistance of such arrays is liable to large (“giant”) variations, depend-
ent on the orientation of the magnetization directions of the two ferrromagnetic layers relative to 
each other. This magnetization direction can be influenced by an outside magnetic field so that the 
electric resistance of the array is affected by such a field. Consequently, its electric resistance indi-
cates the intensity of a surrounding magnetic field. The effect is suitable for building extremely 
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magnetic read heads; it is used for hard disks or magnetic tapes. 
The qualitative explanation of the effect was suggested immediately after its discovery. 
Quantum theory entails for a layered array of this sort that the scattering of electrons should de-
pend on the orientation of the electron spin relative to the prevailing magnetic field. Electron scat-
tering is the mechanism underlying electric resistance so that a relationship between resistance and 
field orientation ensues. Consequently, the basis of giant magnetoresistance is the theoretically 
well-understood spin-dependent scattering of electrons. However, this qualitative understanding 
did not also furnish automatically the pertinent quantitative relations. Knowledge of the precise 
dependence of the pertinent quantities is necessary for any practical use of the effect. If a read 
head is supposed to be constructed, the influence of layer thickness, material properties, tempera-
ture variations and changes of the magnetic field need to be known exactly. The anticipation of 
subtle dependencies of this sort transcended the scope of the theoretical account (Wilholt 2006, 72-
79). 
In order to get access to the details of the phenomenon, a local model needs to be built. Its 
conceptual structure reflects the theoretical account and yields consequences to the effect that the 
sensitivity of resistance changes essentially hinges on two parameters, namely, material properties 
and layer geometry (i.e., the thickness of the layer and the spatial dimensions of the system). The 
model also entails generic consequences as to the impact of certain such properties and arrays but 
leaves large room for empirical adjustment. In order to arrive at “design rules” for particular de-
vices, a huge number of parameters need to be evaluated empirically and their impact on the quan-
tities in questions be measured. When it came to figuring out the precise relations, as requisite for 
the construction of reliable contrivances, recourse to empirical adjustment was indispensible (Wil-
holt 2006, 79-80).
4. Why Resort to Theories in Applied Research? 
Yet in spite of the limited grip of theory on the phenomena, theoretical understanding is 
useful in applied research. It is helpful to bring to bear theory on practical problems although theo-
retical understanding is often limited to the generic features of the situation whereas reliable inter-
vention often needs to take the details into account. Let me sketch three pertinent reasons which 
have to do with the identification of relevant quantities, the generalization of the results, and with 
ascertaining their reliability in the face of distortions. 
The first reason for drawing on theory is the crucial assistance it offers for the identifica-
tion of the relevant quantities. Theoretical accounts serve to highlight the influential magnitudes
and suggest relations among them. In this way they accomplish a figure-ground distinction which 
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the quantum mechanical (or semi-classical) analysis helped to unfold the space of potentially rele-
vant quantities which could subsequently be studied by measuring the precise relationship that 
obtains between them. Empirical investigation is facilitated considerably by such a theory-based 
distinction of potentially relevant factors. 
This is not distinctive of applied science but rather characterizes scientific research in gen-
eral. Examples from the history of science provide ample testimony to the fact that relations which 
appear obvious with hindsight had escaped the notice of experimenters and were only identified 
after theoreticians had indicated what to look for. For instance, Brownian motion was studied in-
tensively for decades in search for observational regularities without success. In fact, simple such 
regularities do govern the phenomenon but they were missed since researchers failed to pay atten-
tion to the right quantities. Only after Albert Einstein had predicted these relations in 1905 on the 
basis of theoretical analysis, they were found in observation. 
Second, the generalization of theory-shaped models is much easier than the transfer of phe-
nomenological models to new cases encountered. Phenomenological models are shaped conceptu-
ally by the demands of the problem-situation at hand. They are not necessarily completely inde-
pendent of theory, but they contain comparatively few elements that transcend the particulars of 
the explanatory challenge to be dealt with. As a result, each such phenomenon needs to be ap-
proached on its own terms. For instance, the prediction of the tidal flow of a particular harbor is 
not based on the known causal mechanism underlying the phenomenon but is rather achieved by 
performing a Fourier analysis of the tidal oscillations observed in the past. The reason is that the 
influence of a multiplicity of factors relevant for the quantitative details of tidal flow (such as 
coastline, water depth, currents) can hardly be assessed on first principles so that the phenomenol-
ogical analysis is more accurate. The drawback is that results gained by this method cannot be 
transferred to different coastal areas; the latter need to be addressed completely afresh. By con-
trast, theory-based models whose empirical shortcomings are rectified by parameter fitting and 
correction factors can be used for a whole class of phenomena. Without employing generic con-
ceptions, each phenomenon had to be attacked without benefitting from the solution to the former. 
This feature comes out clearly in the giant-magnetoresistance case. The standard arrange-
ment is a “current-in-plane” geometry in which the electric current flows parallel to the layers of 
the sandwich-like structure. A different arrangement is the “current-perpendicular-to-plane” ge-
ometry, which underlies the most recent development of computer hard disks since it allows a fur-
ther shrinking in size. This arrangement can be modeled using the same theoretical approaches as 
applied to the standard case (Wilholt 2006, 83). By contrast, if this configuration had been ap-
8proached on a purely experimental basis it would have to be captured completely on its own. This 
shows that empirical investigation is facilitated considerably by a theory-based distinction of po-
tentially relevant factors. Theoretical accounts serve to highlight the influential quantities and sug-
gest relations among them. Experiments are appealed to, subsequently, in order to examine the 
models and to fill the lacunae left by them. 
Third and finally, theories are of outstanding importance when the reliability of a device or 
procedure is to be secured in the face of distorting factors. Ascertaining reliablity typically de-
mands elucidating the underlying causal mechanism. The history of pharmacological research is 
replete with examples of this sort. Statements about the therapeutic efficacy of a certain medical 
drug are initially phrased as “contextualized causal relations.” Such relations are restricted to typi-
cal or normal conditions and leave the pertinent causal processes out of consideration. “Aspirin 
relieves headache” is a statement of this sort: it usually holds true but possesses exceptions for 
particular persons or conditions, and it contains nothing as to how the effect is brought about. If 
the efficiency of the drug is to be improved or pernicious side-effects are to be controlled, the 
mechanism of action needs to be cleared up. For instance, research on how to circumvent bacterial 
resistance against antibiotics is targeted on how the drug acts and how the bacterium responds. 
Likewise, individualized drug treatment, which is among the foci of contemporary medical re-
search, needs to draw on a thorough understanding of the interaction of the agent with the molecu-
lar tissue characteristics of the person at hand. In sum, if perturbations intrude, upholding the de-
sired operation of a procedure demands theoretical penetration. 
These considerations suggest that overarching theories rightly continue to conceptually 
shape models in applied research and thereby structure the account of the phenomena while leav-
ing room for empirical adaptation. In fact, theory structure in applied research is not represented 
by a scattered collection of isolated accounts. Rather, the local models put to use remain linked up 
with higher-order accounts (Carrier 2004b, 14). Theoretical integration and the understanding 
thereby generated are essential in applied research although technological devices and inventions 
need more than theory and heavily draw on empirical adaptation and correction eventually. 
5. Uses of Understanding in Technology Development
The first question is where all this leaves us with respect to the contrast between the cas-
cade model and the emergentist approach. In light of the preceding considerations, both positions 
need to be abandoned and give way to an interactive view which preserves aspects of either posi-
tion. This interactive view stresses that non-theoretical factors like unexplained properties and cor-
rections play an important role in technology development but also emphasizes that the models 
used for representing the technologically relevant physical processes are conceptually shaped by 
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tance of situation-specific factors. The interactive view accepts the emergentist claim that nature is 
multifaceted in character and cannot be accounted for without remainder by comprehensive prin-
ciples. The wealth of the particulars outweigh the impact of the universal. Yet the emergentist ap-
proach overshoots the goal by denying theoretical analysis an essential role in the generation of 
useful knowledge. The best way to deal with multifarious experience is by bringing to bear univer-
sal principles and to correct for their shortcomings by empirical adjustments. 
The second question is what kind of relationship between technological change and scien-
tific progress this interactive view suggests. To begin with, the demise of the cascade model im-
plies that there is no monocausal chain leading from a scientific discovery up to a technological 
innovation. Scientific progress is in no way the only source and stimulus for technological change; 
it may not even represent a predominant influence. First, on the part of the knowledge input, a ma-
jor part of technology development draws on empirical generalizations and ad-hoc adjustments 
rather than on systematic theory, let alone on cutting-edge research findings. Second, it has been 
pointed out frequently that societal demands and market conditions constitute chief driving forces 
of technology development and heavily affect pathways of technological change. Institutional 
structures, social exigencies, market demands, traditions, or perceived weaknesses of existing sys-
tems are the determinants of the pathways of technology. Scientific discoveries and scientific pro-
gress are conspicuous by their absence. This can be made more explicit by a quick glance at some 
“radical inventions” of the past which profoundly transformed the technological systems dominant 
at the time: Alexander Bell and the electric telephone, Henry Ford and the assembly line for auto-
mobile production, Ferdinand Graf von Zeppelin and the dirigible airship. The crux to these inven-
tions was not supplied by recent progress in understanding; the knowledge that went into them was 
fairly standard and well established. They were rather due to an engineering type of creativity: new 
devices were assembled from existing building blocks and widely available components. 
These considerations suggest that the technological dynamics proceeds to a considerable
extent decoupled from scientific progress. I will add qualifications later but stress right away that 
this is no way meant to imply that technological development can proceed without a scientific ba-
sis. To be sure, inventions and technological innovations do not, as a rule, draw on more recent 
scientific discoveries. Still, technological novelites do rest on scientific knowledge. Here is an ex-
ample. 
A recent technology invented at the University of South Carolina and developed into a 
marketable product by a company serves to monitor the composition of substances (like drugs or 
food) using spectroscopic means. The procedure is based on the separation of the spectrum of the 
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expected active ingredient from the background radiation using filters which transmit light only at 
some selected frequencies, characteristic of the compounds whose concentration is relevant. The 
advantage is that this quality control can be performed in real time during the production process 
and can thus be used for instant correction and adjustment (Nelson 1998). 
This technology is buttressed by two pillars of established knowledge, namely, spectral 
analysis in optics and the mathematical procedure of factor analysis. These two received tech-
niques are combined using a particular array of color filters—which is not a spectacularly sophisti-
cated technology either. It is the novel combination of known elements of scientific knowledge 
that constituted the technological innovation. Moreover, the combination itself was due rather to 
tinkering than to deduction. Different setups were tried out and the best one retained (Baird 2006). 
This example shows that technology development is, in fact, dependent on science but is 
not always hot on the heels of scientific progress. The science invoked is of some age but maturity 
doesn’t make knowledge less scientific. Although this invention did not rely on recent findings in 
basic research, it is essentially science-based. The body of scientific knowledge constitutes a huge 
reservoir of technological options which can be tapped at various locations, not alone at the more 
recent additions (Rosenberg 1991, 337). Although scientific progress does not anticipate the path-
ways of technological development, hardly any significant change in an advanced technology 
lacks a scientific basis.
While the dependence of technological novelties on established knowledge is in accor-
dance with the cascade model, the latter is deficient in a different respect. It fails to take the effect
of technology on science into account. First, the development of new instruments for registration 
and experimentation repeatedly contributed to opening up new intellectual horizons for science. 
Second, applied research is not infrequently faced with challenges of a more fundamental bearing. 
The adequate treatment of practical problems may require to address the fundamental challenges
as well. In such cases the necessary basic research may be conducted within applied research pro-
jects. This feature I call application innovation. It involves the emergence of theoretically signifi-
cant novelties within the framework of use-oriented research projects. 
A large number of such use-oriented projects in the life sciences address questions of fun-
damental impact. Consider the revolutionary conceptions of “retrovirus” or “prion” which were 
both conceived in the context of identifying infectious chains. The reduplication of a retrovirus
involves the reversal of the familiar directedness of transcription from DNA to RNA, a directed-
ness which was formerly supposed to be universal. Prions were conceived as infectious proteins 
which assumedly reproduce without assistance of nucleic acids (DNA or RNA). The initial aim of 
the pertinent studies was to gain useful knowledge about the spread of diseases but they generated 
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a deep-reaching transformation of biological concepts. Pursuing practical questions can have a 
revolutionary impact on the fundamentals. 
Application innovation amounts to a partial vindication of the cascade model. It is true that 
the cascade model says that the most effective way to foster applied science is to support pure sci-
ence. The sketched examples suggest to the contrary that stimulation may proceed in the opposite 
direction. However, the cascade model also says that applied science is in its substance based on 
basic research. The need to take recourse to theoretical principles in meeting practical challenges is 
made evident by the formulation of such principles in case they are missing. The temporal rela-
tions between science and technology are at odds with the cascade model if application innovation 
occurs. But the logical relations are yet in agreement with the model (Carrier 2004a, 291). 
6. Science Policy and Technological Benefits 
What remains to be clarified is how the interactive view translates into a science policy and 
a funding strategy. Such policies are usually directed at supporting technological innovations; 
sponsors typically aim at useful science or theories for use. The impact and success of such poli-
cies depend crucially on how science and technology are connected to each other. Bush’s idea that 
progress in basic research is the prime mover of technology dynamics translates into a funding 
policy that gives priority to broad basic research. However, the underlying idea is mistaken: tech-
nology development is rarely based on cutting-edge basic research. In the short run, technological 
change is largely independent of progress in fundamental science. On the other hand, technological 
change hinges essentially on scientific knowledge. Although existing technologies and rules of 
experience constitute another major repository of technological inventions, science constitutes the 
pivot of technology development. As a result, stopping basic research means drying up the wells 
and spoiling the seed for future harvest. Accordingly, it remains true that, in the long run, basic 
research amounts to plowing the field and cultivating the soil so that it bear fruit later. Yet this is a 
long-term effect whose time-scale is estimated in decades, not years, the usual time-span of sci-
ence-funding decisions.
Application innovation suggests that the basic research necessary for sustaining applied re-
search may grow out of applied research itself. In such cases applied research produces on its own 
the knowledge basis required for the solution of applied problems. It generates scientific innova-
tions rather than drawing on them. Basic research may be inspired by considerations of use 
(Rosenberg 1990, 169; Stokes 1997, 74). As a matter of fact, all the cases I am aware of in which 
cutting-edge research was transformed quickly into a technological novelty are “use-inspired basic 
research” (to use Stokes’ phrase; Stokes 1997, 93). The spectrum ranges from the nuclear fission 
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reactor to the speedy commercial use of the polymerase chain reaction (PCR).1 Giant magnetore-
sistance likewise resulted in marketable technological devices within a short period. Application 
innovations represent a gain in understanding achieved in pursuing a practical goal. Under such 
conditions, the new knowledge bears directly on the issues at hand and promotes the rapid trans-
formation of a scientific accomplishment into a technological novelty. This is the qualification 
indicated earlier (see sec. 5). In cases of application innovation, the practical relevance of basic 
understanding tends to come out more quickly and the time lag between scientific discovery and 
its technological implementation is frequently measured in years, not decades. 
The interactive view emerging from this discussion amounts to the claim that the body of 
scientific knowledge and the existing technologies both constitute most important sources of tech-
nology development and that, conversely, technology development may stimulate scientific pro-
gress. The network of non-scientific factors involved in technology development makes it clear, on 
the other hand, that the translation of scientific knowledge into technological change is dependent 
on a number societal presuppositions. Recent studies have revealed that without a suitably ar-
ranged economic framework like grant opportunities and funding options, most of the seemingly 
promising inventions schemes that grow out of research, remain unexplored and wither away. 
Mere publication is rarely sufficient for instigating corporate research and development activities. 
In the majority of practical challenges, the influx from science does not set on spontaneously; 
rather, the faucet needs to be opened—usually by publicly sponsored incentives.2
What does this scheme imply for the initial question whether science policy rather support 
focused practical research projects or broad epistemic research? In contrast to what was suggested 
by the Bush report, applied research does not detract from the epistemic aspirations and achieve-
ments of science. In general, the fear is unfounded that the search for utility drives out the quest 
for understanding. On the contrary, not infrequently practical problems bring theoretical chal-
lenges in their train which need to be taken care of by epistemic research if the the practical en-
deavor is supposed to get off the ground. The relationship between epistemic and applied research 
often transcends a peaceful coexistence and rather approaches mutual reinforcement. What is es-
sential, however, for letting this potential of reciprocal stimulation unfold is to leave room or lei-
sure for hooking up the practical goals with the theoretical framework. Research producing light 
1 The institutional motors of such innovations are often start-up companies, not established corpo-
rations which rather emphasize incremental inventions (Etzkowitz 2006, 316). 
2 In this vein, Henry Etzkowitz speaks of an “assisted linear model,” which means that the cascade 
from science to technology needs to be set in motion by active government intervention (Etzko-
witz 2006, 314-316, 319).
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and fruit at the same time, to use Bacon’s apt phrase, requires the willingness and the freedom to 
address epistemic challenges as they emerge along the road toward some practical research goal.
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